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Europe|How We Obtained and Vetted a Russian Intelligence Document
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/07/world/europe/russia-intelligence-documents-leak-how.html
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A directive from Russia’s domestic security service was part of a cache that was advertised online by a cybercrime group.
June 7, 2025, 5:01 a.m. ET
On the popular messaging app Telegram, cybercriminals advertise stolen government documents from around the world. Intelligence briefings from Indonesia for $5,000. Diplomatic cables from Taiwan for $10,000. The identities of Iranian spies for $3,000.
Anybody is welcome to browse these channels. They are entirely anonymous.
In November, a crime group known as Ares Leaks announced on Telegram that it was selling classified Russian intelligence documents. The group claimed that the records originated from inside the Federal Security Service, or F.S.B.
The New York Times does not pay its sources or buy stolen documents. But we do accept documents that are provided without cost or strings attached. And it is common practice for sellers like Ares Leaks to share free samples.
In this case, Ares Leaks provided snapshots of Russian intelligence documents and, most important, a complete F.S.B. counterintelligence document about China. More documents were available, the group said, for a negotiable price paid in the cryptocurrency Monero.
The sample document on China appeared to come from the security agency’s Department for Counterintelligence Operations, known as the D.K.R.O. And it offered tantalizing insight into Russia’s relationship with China, one of the most important — and least understood — alliances in modern geopolitics. It described deep concerns in Moscow about Chinese espionage, and it revealed that Russia operates a secretive program to organize and analyze data from the popular Chinese messaging app WeChat.
The document looked consistent with F.S.B. records that have previously been made public. Times reporters who have studied Russian espionage for years analyzed the material and saw nothing immediately suspicious.
